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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
of persons previously engaged in the traffic at the time of the
adoption of the ordinance. The Smythe case and its contempo-
rary jurisprudence is discussed in an annotation in 6 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 722 (1907).
LEGISLATION
Charles A. Reynard*
Six of the cases decided by the court at last term involved
significant applications of rules governing enactment and inter-
pretation of legislation.1 These cases fell into two groups: the
first, consisting of two cases, posed the problem of the Legisla-
ture's disregard for its own rules of procedure, while the second
group, consisting of four cases, presented the always trouble-
some question of the latest expression of legislative will.
State v. Lawrence2 and State v. Gray3 were criminal prose-
cutions in which the defendants were charged with violating
the provisions of the state's Uniform Narcotics Drug Law4 as
amended by Act 30, First Extra Session of 1951. In both cases
the defendants contended that the amendatory act was invalid
for non-compliance by the Senate with the state constitutional
requirement that "no bill shall be considered for final passage
unless it . . . has been reported on by a committee."5 The un-
disputed facts showed, however, that the bill subsequently
emerging as the act in question had been favorably reported
by the Senate's Committee on Finance and that would seem
to have foreclosed the defense which was urged. But the
defendants in both cases argued that the constitutional require-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. There were, of course, numerous other cases involving settled prin-
ciples of statutory construction arising in substantive fields of the law.
Many of these cases are dealt with elsewhere in this Symposium. See, e.g.,
Mataya v. Delta Life Insurance Company, 222 La. 509, 62 So. 2d 817 (1953)
which is discussed under the Insurance title, infra p. 167.
In the case of State v. Wilson, 221 La. 990, 60 So. 2d 897 (1952) the
court held that the savings clause of an act repealing a local option statute
served to continue in existence and effect any ordinance adopted prior to
local option laws. This subject is discussed in symposium, The Work of
the Supreme Court for the 1950-1951 Term, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 125-
127 (1952).
2. 221 La. 861, 60 So. 2d 464 (1952).
3. 221 La. 868, 60 So. 2d 466 (1952).
4. La. R.S. 1950, 40:961 et seq.
5. La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 24.
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ment contemplated a properly created committee, and that
under the circumstances of this case the Senate Committee on
Finance (to which the bill was referred) was improperly con-
stituted, having been created on the same day on which it was
proposed, contrary to the provisions of the Senate Rules which
declare that one day's previous written notice must be given
for the creation of new committees.6 No such notice had been
given and the committee so created to which the bill was re-
ferred was in fact a new committee, thereby lending at least
superficial support to the contentions of the defendants. The
court rejected the claim, however, pointing out that the Senate
had voted 32 to 6 to create the committee and that, in effect,
this was an alteration of rather than a violation of the existing
rule requiring one day's notice for changes therein. Since the
State Constitution expressly authorizes each house to ". . . deter-
mine the rules of its procedure, . . ."I it is submitted that this is a
wholly reasonable conclusion-at least in the setting of these
cases. There is a conceivably valid basis for courts to interfere
in cases of this nature at the suit of a member of the legisla-
tive body itself, for whose protection the rules are adopted, but
to sustain attacks upon legislative enactments at the instance
of third parties is a different matter. Mutual respect for the right
of each department of government to control its own proce-
dures is an inherent attribute of the doctrine of the separation
of the powers of government, and judicial supervision of the
legislative process would lead to resentment and possibly to
resort to subterfuge if a different conclusion were reached in
these kinds of cases.
Three of the four cases involving the principle of the latest
expression of legislative will were proceedings filed by plain-
tiffs claiming to be the properly designated judges of three
different city courts.8 In each case the plaintiff had been ap-
pointed to the office by the Governor with confirmation by the
Senate, and in each case, the unexpired terms for which the
plaintiffs were appointed had more than one year to run. In
each case the plaintiffs invoked the provisions of a legislative
act of 19341 in support of the Governor's authority to make
6. Rule No, 65 of the Senate then in session.
7. La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 10.
8. Chappuis v. Reggie, 222 La. 35, 62 So. 2d 92 (1952); Babineaux v.
Lacobie, 222 La. 45, 62 So. 2d 95 (1952); State ex rel. Fudickar v. Heard,
223 La. 127, 65 So. 2d 112 (1953).
9. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 1 (2 E.S.).
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the appointment; and in each case the defendants invoked the
language of a legislative enactment of 191210 as a bar to the
claim. The provision of both acts had been carried into the
Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 as Sections 371 and 373 of
Title 42. It is to be noted, therefore, that while these two acts
were originally adopted in 1912 and 1934, they were both re-
enacted simultaneously, as a part of the Revised Statutes of 1950.
The provision of the 1934 act read as follows:
"Except as is otherwise required by the constitution and
laws of the United States and the constitution of the State
of Louisiana, and except in other cases where the law al-
ready provides for vacancies in office to be filled by appoint-
ment by the governor, whenever a vacancy occurs in any
state, district, parish, ward, or municipal office, by reason
of death, resignation or otherwise, the said vacancy shall
be filled by appointment of the governor, by and with the
advice and consent of the senate, until the next regular
election shall be held, according to law."
The provision of the 1912 act read as follows:
"When a vacancy is caused by death, resignation, or
removal, or otherwise of any officer of the State of Louisi-
ana, of any parish, district or any sub-division of the state,
it shall be' filled by election, provided that the said office is,
by law, made elective by the people, and further provided
that the unexpired term is for. a longer period than one
year. The election to fill the vacancy shall be ordered by
proper legal authority within the least possible delay under
the general election laws of the state."
A literal minded court might easily have taken the 1934
expression of the Legislature to have repealed, by implication,
the provisions of the 1912 enactment, as it (the 1934 act) leaves
no room for the operation of laws of the State of Louisiana,
and seemingly covers all cases of vacancies in office, regard-
less of the length of the unexpired term. Rejecting a literal
approach, however, Chief Justice Fournet, for a unanimous
court, made the following observations:
"The uniform jurisprudence is to the effect that all statu-
tory provisions are to be given effect whenever possible.
(citing Article 17 of the Civil Code of Louisiana and cases)
10. La. Act 112 of 1912, § 1.
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If acts can be reconciled by a fair and reasonable interpre-
tation, it must be done, since the repeal of a statute by
implication is not favored and will not be indulged if there
is any other reasonable construction. (citing cases) More-
over, where two acts relating to the same subject are passed
at the same legislative session, there is a strong presump-
tion against implied repeal, and they are to be construed
together, if possible, so as to reconcile them, giving effect
to each."'"
Upon the basis of the principle thus so clearly expounded, the
court proceeded to sustain both acts, by reading the 1912 enact-
ment as a qualification upon the 1934 statute, limiting the power
of the Governor to fill vacancies by appointment only in those
instances where the unexpired term was for a period of less
than one year. It is submitted that the result is sound, in keep-
ing with reasonable precedent, and most probably accords with
legislative intent.
In the face of the result reached in the three cases just
discussed, it is most difficult to explain the decision in the
fourth case of this group, State v. St. Julian,1 and it is submitted
that it represents a departure from the principles announced in
those three opinions. The St. Julian case is noted in the pre-
vious volume of this REVIEW13 and accordingly no extended dis-
cussion is presented here. The salient facts were that the Legis-
lature in 1952 adopted two acts, both amending the provisions
of Sections 179 and 180 of Title 15 of the Revised Statutes of
1950 relating to juries. Act 158 amended the sections so as to
permit the calling of a larger list of jurors. Act 303 authorized
the preparation of jury lists in typewritten form. In all other
respects each act tracked the language of the pre-existing sec-
tions. Hence a literal conflict resulted when it was sought to
determine the resultant state of the law. In arriving at its
conclusion the court disregarded what to this writer seems to
have been the obvious intention of the Legislature, that is to
amend the pre-existing sections in both respects, and held that
because of literal conflict, the act which was passed and signed
first in point of time was repealed and superseded by that which
was last. As is more forcefully indicated in the note just referred
to, this is to make more of clerical happenstance than of legis-
11. Chappuis v. Reggie, 222 La. 35, 43, 62 So. 2d 92, 95 (1952).
12. 221 La. 1018, 61 So. 2d 464 (1952).
13. Note, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 606 (1953).
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lative intention, particularly in Louisiana where all except
emergency legislation becomes effective at the same date and
hour. It is submitted that by the use of the same realistic
doctrines which it invoked in -the cases of the disappointed
city judges, the court could have saved both acts and achieved
what was most obviously the Legislature's true intent.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Henry G. McMahon*
EXTENSION OF MUNICIPAL LnMTrs
Two grounds of the invalidity of an annexation ordinance
were relied upon in Doise v. Town of Elton., The principal ques-
tion presented was with respect to the reasonableness of the
annexation, an issue which the trial judge had resolved in favor
of the municipality. The intermediate appellate court, after a
review of the evidence, had concluded that the annexation was
unreasonable, as it found that the additional area was not needed
for the normal growth of the community and that annexation
would not provide the residents thereof with additional sewerage
facilities, nor added flood, police, or fire protection. 2 Under a
writ of review, the Supreme Court reversed this decision of the
court of appeal. The fact that the former municipal limits in-
cluded areas not yet developed was held inconclusive in a deter-
mination of the need for the area sought to be annexed. The
unsuitability of these undeveloped areas within the corporate
limits for the construction of new homes, the population increase
within the municipality of more than fifty per cent within the
past decade, and the recent building of a number of new resi-
dences within the area sought to be annexed, all were held to
support the reasonableness of the annexation ordinance.
The second question was presented by the adoption of the
annexation ordinance at a meeting of the governing body of
the town which twice had been continued by unanimous consent
of the aldermen. The argument of the annexation opponents
that the applicable statute prohibited more than a single continu-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 222 La. 973, 64 So. 2d 238 (1953).
2. 56 So. 2d 604 (La. App. 1952).
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